# Simultaneous Detection and Characterization of Time Delay Attack in Cyber-Physical Systems

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# Background

- Cyber-Physical Systems
- Time Delay Attack
- System and Threat Models

#### **Cyber Physical Systems**



H. Farhangi, "The path of the smart grid", IEEE power and energy magazine, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 18–28, 2009.



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A. Sargolzaei, et al., "Time-delay switch attack on load frequency control in smart grid", Advances in Communication Technology, vol. 5, pp. 55–64, 2013.



#### Why TDA?

- No abrupt change in signal traffic
- Does not require breaking the signal encryptions
- Can cause serious damage in closed loop systems

#### Impact Assessment and Mitigation



#### System Model

- Closed loop discrete-time CPS control systems (PPCS and AGC)
- Time is divided into slots
- Running simulations to create both training and testing dataset
- System is subjected to disturbances, e.g., measurement noises, actuation biases, setpoint changes, etc

X. Lou, et al., "Assessing and mitigating impact of time delay attack : Case study for power grid controls", IEEE JSAC, vol. 38, no. 1, pp.141–155, 2020.

#### Threat Model

- Packet is maliciously delayed by  $\tau$  but not tampered ( $\tau$  is an integer)
- Attack launched with a random delay value (τ) and a random delay location
- Assumption : Lack of a trustworthy clock synchronization between the controller and the actuator

X. Lou, et al., "Assessing and mitigating impact of time delay attack : Case study for power grid controls", IEEE JSAC, vol. 38, no. 1, pp.141–155, 2020.

# Challenges & Motivation

- Model-driven vs Data-driven methods
- Real-Time vs
  - Post-mortem analysis
- Long Input Streams

#### Model-driven vs Data-driven methods

- Mathematical modeling creates highly complex models which are not robust to real-world noise
- Data-driven methods can learn to extract useful latent features that cannot be modelled manually
- Data-driven methods are easier to generalize and does not require domain expertise

#### Real-time vs Post-mortem analysis

#### <u>Real-time Analysis</u>

- Can help prevent damage
- Input information is a continuous data stream
- Can be inaccurate initially, but has the ability to improve over time

#### Post-mortem Analysis

- Does not have any direct practical use
- Complete input trace is available.
- Can be fairly accurate as it has seen the complete input signal

#### Long continuously running input stream

- Updating the output based on only the new input
- Processing the complete input signal at every time step can be very expensive
- Long input streams can lose information from the past. Traditional LSTMs are not suitable for the task

# **Our Solution**

- Hierarchical LSTM
- Multi-head Output
- Asynchronous Training
- Interpretation Strategies
- Evaluation Results

### **Hierarchical LSTM**





#### Traditional LSTM

#### **Hierarchical LSTM**

## **Hierarchical LSTM**





#### Traditional LSTM

#### **Hierarchical LSTM**

# **Hierarchical LSTM**





Periodic removed links in lower LSTM

#### Traditional LSTM

**Hierarchical LSTM** 

#### **Specialized Detection and Characterization**

HLSTM layers



#### **Specialized Detection and Characterization**



Regression Output (Characterization)

#### **Specialized Detection and Characterization**



# Asynchronous Training



# Asynchronous Training



# Asynchronous Training



#### Flexible Interpretability (Regression)











Input data stream



















#### **Evaluation Metrics**

• MAE and RMSE

To evaluate the characterization head
Accuracy, False Positive and False Negative
To evaluate the detection head

<sup>avg</sup> -- To evaluate average characterization latency

• HLSTM outperforms Accumulate LSTM or Vanilla LSTM, under the same multi-task head training and testing setup

Approach	Classification (Detection)			Regression (Characterization)			
	Accuracy	FP	FN	MAE	RMSE	T <sub>avg</sub>	
Vanilla LSTM + Multi-task	85.21%	9.7%	5.1%	4.17	8.76	136	
Accumulate LSTM + Multi-task	89.76%	7.1%	3.3%	2.76	6.03	168	
HLSTM + Multi-task	92.39%	4.7%	2.9%	2.03	5.48	128	

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2 HLSTM + Multi-task	93.03%	3.7%	3.2%	2.02	5.53	124	

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#### **Comparing Against Baseline Models (PPCS)**

- Deep learning models can reduce the error to almost half, when compared against traditional models like kNN and RF
- All existing methods provide post-mortem analysis, but our method can provide real-time results, reducing the average reaction latency from 300s to 128s while improving the error even further

Approach	Classification (Detection)			Regression (Characterization)			
	Accuracy	FP	FN	MAE	RMSE	T <sub>avg</sub>	
kNN	72.6%	11.8%	15.6%	6.23	9.48	300	
Random Forest	80.82%	5.2%	13.9%	6.44	10.32	300	
(Lou et al, 2019)				3.73	6.84	300	
Our Model	92.39%	4.7%	2.9%	2.03	5.48	128	

X. Lou, et al., "Learning-based time delay attack characterization for cyber-physical systems", IEEE SmartGridComm, AI in Energy Systems (Invited Paper), 2019.

### **Comparing Against Baseline Models (AGC)**

Approach	Classification (Detection)			Regression (Characterization)			
	Accuracy	FP	FN	MAE	RMSE	T <sub>avg</sub>	
kNN	71.29%		28.7%	3.27	5.02	200	
Random Forest	74.57%		25.4%	3.41	4.10	200	
(Lou et al, 2019)				1.34	2.17	200	
Vanilla LSTM + Multi-task	81.07%		18.9%	1.74	3.84	63	
Accumulate LSTM + Multi-task	97.71%		2.3%	0.77	1.42	65	
HLSTM + Regression only				1.07	1.84	81	
2 HLSTM + Multi-task	99.09%		0.9%	0.47	0.91	57	
HLSTM + Multi-task	98.49%		1.5%	0.49	0.98	49	

#### Interpretation Strategies (Classification)



#### Interpretation Strategies (Regression)



#### **Exploring Model Sensitivity (PPCS)**



### **Exploring Model Sensitivity (PPCS)**



PPCS can actually tolerate upto  $\tau$ =12 value delay attack with no harm

X. Lou, et al., "Assessing and mitigating impact of time delay attack : Case study for power grid controls", IEEE JSAC, vol. 38, no. 1, pp.141–155, 2020.

## Exploring Model Sensitivity (AGC)



#### In Conclusion

- Time Delay Attacks are unique cyber attacks that are difficult to detect and can cause real harm to the system
- A majority of existing solutions to TDA are dependent on mathematical modelling of the system, and perform post-mortem analysis.
- We propose a learning-based solution to detect and characterize TDA
- We propose hierarchical LSTM backbone to deal with longer sequences, multi-tasking head specialised to do detection and characterization, and various strategies to improve the interpretability of our model.
- We provide significant improvement in accuracy while reducing the reaction latency by 3-4 times.

**Thank You**