

Image generated using Sora



27-05-2025

Technical Mitigation Strategies

Khaoula Chehbouni and Prakhar Ganesh

About me



Prakhar Ganesh (he/him)

PhD student in Computer Science at McGill University / Mila

Research in Fairness and Privacy in AI & Multiplicity in AI

Why Responsible AI?

Overcoming Racial Bias In AI Systems And Startlingly Even In AI Self-Driving Cars Racial bias in a medical algorithm favors white patients over sicker black patients

AI expert calls for end to UK use of 'racially biased' algorithms

Gender bias in Al: building fairer algorithms

Millions of black people affected by racial bias in health-care algorithms

Study reveals rampant racism in decision-making software used by US hospitals – and highlights ways to correct it.

AI Bias Could Put Women's Lives At Risk - A Challenge For Regulators

Amazon, Apple, Google, IBM, and Microsoft worse at transcribing black people's voices than white people's with Al voice recognition, study finds

When It Comes to Gorillas, Google Photos Remains Blind

Google promised a fix after its photo-categorization software labeled black people as gorillas in 2015. More than two years later, it hasn't found one.

The Week in Tech: Algorithmic Bias Is Bad. Uncovering It Is Good.

Bias in AI: A problem recognized but

Google 'fixed' its racist algorithm by removing gorillas from its image-labeling tech


Artificial Intelligence has a gender bias problem – just ask Siri


The Best Algorithms Struggle to Recognize Black Faces Equally

US government tests find even top-performing facial recognition systems misidentify blacks at rates five to 10 times higher than they do whites.

https://medium.com/data-science/algorithm-bias-in-artificial-intelligence-needs-to-be-discussed-and-addressed-8d369d675a70

still unresolved





Outline of the Talk

Technical Mitigation Strategies in ML

- A Broader Perspective: Rashomon Effect and Multiplicity
- Fairness/Bias in Al
- Robustness in Al
- Privacy in Al
- Explainability/Interpretability in AI

Technical Mitigation Strategies in LLMs

- Safety Challenges in LLMs
- The Safety Mitigation Pipeline
- Are Safety Safeguards Robust?
- Explainability in LLMs

Technical Mitigation Strategies in ML

A Broader Perspective: *Rashomon Effect and Multiplicity*

Based on *Rashomon (1950)* by Akira Kurosawa




Rashomon effect is "a combination of a difference of perspective and equally plausible accounts, with the absence of evidence to elevate one above others, with the inability to disqualify any particular version of the truth..."

Rashomon effect is "a combination of a **difference of perspective** and **equally plausible accounts**, with the absence of evidence to elevate one above others, with the inability to disqualify any particular version of the truth..."


Rashomon effect is "a combination of a difference of perspective and equally plausible accounts, with the **absence of evidence to elevate one above others**, with the **inability to disqualify any particular version** of the truth..."

Rashomon effect is "a combination of a difference of perspective and equally plausible accounts, with the absence of evidence to elevate one above others, with the inability to disqualify any particular version of the truth..."





https://classicallyeducated.wordpress.com/2020/05/1 9/ambrose-bierce-by-way-of-the-rashomon-effect/



https://medium.com/stotle-inc/rashomon-effect-lesso ns-for-building-effective-bi-dashboards-1b484b3137e9



The World





The World




the World














Loan


The World











Statistical Science 2001, Vol. 16, No. 3, 199–231

Statistical Modeling: The Two Cultures

Leo Breiman

"What I call the Rashomon Effect is that there is often a multitude of different descriptions (equations f(x)) in a class of functions giving about the same minimum error rate."

Breiman, L. (2001). Statistical modeling: The two cultures. Statistical science, 16(3), 199-231.



There are many different models which can achieve the same error on the given data

- Some of them might be fairer than others

- Some of them might be fairer than others
- Some of them might be more robust than others

- Some of them might be fairer than others
- Some of them might be more robust than others
- Some of them might be more interpretable than others

- Some of them might be fairer than others
- Some of them might be more robust than others
- Some of them might be more interpretable than others
- Some of them might protect privacy better than others

. . .

- Some of them might be fairer than others
- Some of them might be more robust than others
- Some of them might be more interpretable than others
- Some of them might protect privacy better than others

Fairness/Bias in Al

Bias in Al




https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk -assessments-in-criminal-sentencing


| Gender Classifier | Darker Male | Darker Female | Lighter Male | Lighter Female | Largest Gap |
|----------------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Microsoft | 94.0% | 79.2% | 100% | 98.3% | 20.8% |
| FACE** | 99.3% | 65.5% | 99.2% | 94.0% | 33.8% |
| IBM | 88.0% | 65.3% | 99.7% | 92.9% | 34.4% |




http://gendershades.org/

The Three Definitions of Fairness






Mila




Bias Mitigation: Pre/In/Post-Processing




https://courses.minnalearn.com/en/courses/trustworthy-ai/preview/fairness-and-accountability/ detecting-and-mitigating-bias-and-unfairness/

Balance the Dation Mitigation: Pre-Processing




https://courses.minnalearn.com/en/courses/trustworthy-ai/preview/fairness-and-accountability/ detecting-and-mitigating-bias-and-unfairness/



https://medium.com/@gaikwads070/oversampling-and-undersampling-are-techniques-used-in-d ata-preprocessing-31bc153fb673


Learn to be FaBias Mitigation: In-Processing




https://courses.minnalearn.com/en/courses/trustworthy-ai/preview/fairness-and-accountability/ detecting-and-mitigating-bias-and-unfairness/

Main Takeaway: Learn to be Fair Bias Mitigation: In-Processing


Objective



Objective w/ Regularization




Ganesh, P., Taik, A. and Farnadi, G., 2025. The Curious Case of Arbitrariness in Machine Learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.14959.





https://courses.minnalearn.com/en/courses/trustworthy-ai/preview/fairness-and-accountability/ detecting-and-mitigating-bias-and-unfairness/

Main Takeaway: Adjust Outputs when you Cannot Retrain Bias Mitigation: Post-Processing



https://jonathan-hui.medium.com/address-ai-bias-with-fairness-criteria-tools-9af1ab8e4289

Discrimination Hacking or "D-Hacking"

Multiplicity means we can get,

- An unfair model
- Or a fair model

Discrimination Hacking or "D-Hacking"

Multiplicity means we can get,

- An unfair model
- Or a fair model
- Or a model which is fair on some dataset but unfair when deployed!

Black, E., Gillis, T. and Hall, Z.Y., 2024, June. D-hacking. In Proceedings of the 2024 ACM FAccT (pp. 602-615).

Discrimination Hacking or "D-Hacking"

- Or a model which is fair on some presents to a Single when Reducing Regulatory Requirements to a Single when Dataset/Evaluation can result in D-Hacking!

Black, E., Gillis, T. and Hall, Z.Y., 2024, June. D-hacking. In Proceedings of the 2024 ACM FAccT (pp. 602-615).

Robustness in Al

A dbietrsianialolioca hiftles

Two Types of Robustness





Image generated using Sora




Goodfellow, I.J., Shlens, J. and Szegedy, C., 2014. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572.



AI models can be extremely brittle!


Adversarial Examples

AI models can be extremely brittle!



Adversarial Examples


AI models can be extremely brittle!







AStandaria ITainingg

Adversarial Training





Dong, Y., Xu, K., Yang, X., Pang, T., Deng, Z., Su, H. and Zhu, J., 2022, Exploring Memorization in Adversarial Training. In ICLR.



Privacy in Al

What does privacy mean to you?

Control what information about you is collected, used, or shared

Protection of people's physical selves against invasive procedures

Protection against unwarranted intrusion

Protection of personal communication

What does privacy mean to you?


Control what information about you is collected, used, or shared

The Right to be Left Alone


intrusion

Protection of personal communication


Consider the following example



Consider the following example



Consider the following example



The Promise of Anonymization

| Name | Zipcode | Age | Gender | Genetic Marker for Cancer |
|---------|---------|-----|--------|---------------------------------|
| Alice | 117068 | 27 | F | Yes |
| Bob | 167056 | 64 | Μ | No |
| Charlie | 118567 | 32 | Μ | No |
| David | 191504 | 81 | Μ | No |




Insurance companies: Who has genetic markers for cancer? I would like to raise their premium and get more money! **Alice** has genetic markers for cancer.

The Promise of Anonymization

| Name | Zipcode | Age | Gender | Genetic Marker for Cancer |
|------|---------|-----|--------|---------------------------------|
| | 117068 | 27 | F | Yes |
| | 167056 | 64 | М | No |
| | 118567 | 32 | М | No |
| | 191504 | 81 | М | No |




Insurance companies: Who has genetic markers for cancer? I would like to raise their premium and get more money! A female, aged 27, from zipcode 117068, has genetic markers for cancer.






Insurance companies: Who has genetic markers for cancer? I would like to raise their premium and get more money! A female, aged 27, from zipcode 117068, has genetic markers for cancer.





Insurance companies: Who has genetic markers for cancer? I would like to raise their premium and get more money! **Alice** has genetic markers for cancer.





Insurance companies: Who has genetic markers for cancer? I would like to raise their premium and get more money! **Alice** has genetic markers for cancer.


The Promise of Anonymization

Robust De-anonymization of Large Datasets (How to Break Anonymity of the Netflix Prize Dataset)

Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov


The University of Texas at Austin

February 5, 2008




The Promise of Anonymization

Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely




Differential Privacy



https://medium.com/statice/what-is-differential-privacy-definition-mechanisms-an d-examples-7855bdc318d1

Adding Noise



d-examples-7855bdc318d1

Federated Learning: multiple entities coming together to collaboratively train models while ensuring that their data remains decentralized.

Federated Learning: multiple entities coming together to collaboratively train models while ensuring that their data remains decentralized.

Homomorphic Encryption: performing complex mathematical operations on encrypted data without compromising the encryption.

Federated Learning: multiple entities coming together to collaboratively train models while ensuring that their data remains decentralized.

Homomorphic Encryption: performing complex mathematical operations on encrypted data without compromising the encryption.

Privacy by Design Principles: proactively embedding privacy in ML systems, to anticipate and prevent privacy invasive events before they occur.

Federated Learning: multiple entities coming together to collaboratively train models while ensuring that their data remains decentralized.


Homomorphic Encryption: performing complex mathematical operations on encrypted data without compromising the encryption.

Privacy by Design Principles: proactively embedding privacy in ML systems, to anticipate and prevent privacy invasive events before they occur.

Secure Multi-Party Computations, Zero Knowledge Proofs, ...

Explainability/Interpr etability in AI

On The Road to Transparency



Shafik, W., Hidayatullah, A.F., Kalinaki, K., Gul, H., Zakari, R.Y. and Tufail, A., 2024. A Systematic Literature Review on Transparency and Interpretability of AI models in Healthcare: Taxonomies, Tools, Techniques, Datasets, OpenResearch Challenges, and Future Trends.

Interpretability by Design



Interpretability by Design


"Rashomon sets constructed with noisy data tend to contain simpler models than corresponding Rashomon sets with non noisy data"

The more inherently noisy a task is, the easier it is to find a good and interpretable model!!

Boner, Z., Chen, H., Semenova, L., Parr, R. and Rudin, C., 2024. Using Noise to Infer Aspects of Simplicity Without Learning. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 37, pp.131824-131858.


Explaining Complex Models

Explaining Complex Models: LIME



Ribeiro, M.T., Singh, S. and Guestrin, C., 2016, August. "Why should i trust you?" Explaining the predictions of any classifier. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD international conference on knowledge discovery and data mining (pp. 1135-1144).

Explaining Complex Models: SHAP



https://www.wallstreetmojo.com/shapley-value/

X-Hacking and Fairwashing

Explanations are approximations of how the decisions are being made.

Multiplicity means we can get a model,

- Whose explanations are acceptable
- But the actual prediction mechanism is not!

Sharma, R., Redyuk, S., Mukherjee, S., Sipka, A., Vollmer, S. and Selby, D., 2024. X Hacking: The Threat of Misguided AutoML. arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.08513.

Aïvodji, U., Arai, H., Fortineau, O., Gambs, S., Hara, S. and Tapp, A., 2019, May. Fairwashing: the risk of rationalization. In International Conference on Machine Learning (pp. 161-170). PMLR.

Shahin Shamsabadi, A., Yaghini, M., Dullerud, N., Wyllie, S., Aïvodji, U., Alaagib, A., Gambs, S. and Papernot, N., 2022. Washing the unwashable: On the (im) possibility of fairwashing detection. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 35, pp.14170-14182.